Reserved decision — summary judgment — mandatory injunction — right of way — easement — trespass — access to property — indefeasibility — vexatious claim — arbitration — District Court jurisdiction — Local Government Act 1974, ss 309, 315 & 348 — Land Transfer Act 2017, ss 51 & 114 — Land Transfer Act 1952, sch 7 — Property Law Act 2007, s 319 — Land Transfer (Computer Registers and Electronic Lodgement) Amendment Act 2002, s 66 — Land Transfer Regulations 2018, r 21, Sch 5 cl 14 — Land Transfer Regulations 2002, sch 4 — Krukziener v Hanover Finance Ltd [2008] NZCA 187 — McKellar v Guthrie [1920] NZLR 729 — Spear v Rowlett [1924] NZLR 801 — Cornes v Village Residential Ltd [2021] NZCA 216. The plaintiffs and the defendant owned neighbouring blocks of land. The plaintiffs had a right of way, specified in an easement that was registered in 1982, over the defendant's carpark. They used the right of way to receive and dispatch deliveries to and from their property. However the delivery area could only be accessed by deviating slightly from the path of the right of way, onto the defendant's property. Soon after moving onto his property the defendant's director had refused to allow the plaintiffs to use his property as access, had served them with trespass notices, and had physically blocked part of the right of way to prevent the plaintiffs from using it to access their property. The plaintiffs filed the proceedings, seeking a summary judgment granting a mandatory injunction for the defendant to immediately unblock the right of way, and a permanent injunction stopping the defendant and any successors in title from blocking the right of way again. The defendant opposed the application for summary judgment, raising several points in opposition. The Court rejected the defendant's argument that the local council had extinguished the right of way. The evidence that the defendant produced did not support this argument. The fact that a brick wall blocked part of the right of way did not mean that the right of way was already unusable. An injunction would not be contrary to the defendant's property rights, as the right of way was already registered on the defendant's title at the time of purchase. The application was not vexatious, as the plaintiffs were merely seeking the lawful use of the right of way. There was no requirement for the parties to submit the matter to arbitration, so the Court did have jurisdiction over the matter. All of the defendant's arguments had failed, and the summary judgment was granted. The Court issued a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to stop obstructing the right of way, and a permanent injunction stopping the defendant from breaching its obligations under the easement. The plaintiffs were entitled to costs. Judgment Date: 24 March 2023.