Application for extension of time — provision from estate — election of option — default choice — contracting out agreement — separate property — serious injustice — promissory estoppel — Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 13, 20, 21J, 24, 61, 69, 70 & 90 — Family Protection Act 1955, ss 4 & 9 — Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 — IER v GJB FC Rotorua, FAM 2008-063-123, 16 February 2009 — Sanders v Trustees Executors & Agency Company of New Zealand Ltd (2004) FRNZ 202 (FC) — Thrasher v Allard [2013] NZFC 5260 — Thurston v Thurston [2014] NZHC 2267 — Harrison v Harrison [2005] 2 NZLR 349, (2004) 24 FRNZ 30 (CA) — Ritchie v Ritchie (1991) 8 FRNZ 197, [1992] NZFLR 266 (HC) — Re Brown (deceased) [1949] NZLR 509 (SC) — Re Crocker [1991] 8 FRNZ 584 — Little v Angus [1981] 1 NZLR 126 (CA). The applicant sought an extension of time to select Option A pursuant to s 61 of the Property (Relationships) Act ("PRA") and to set aside the contracting out agreement between her and the deceased willmaker. The applicant and the willmaker had been in a 14-year de facto relationship prior to the willmaker's death, and had entered into a contracting out agreement in order to protect their separate property for their respective children. The Will stipulated that the applicant could live in the willmaker's house for two years following his death at which point it would revert to the willmaker's son. In order to grant an extension of time a court had to consider the length of delay, the reasons for delay, the merits of the case, and whether it would unfairly prejudice the other party. The Judge considered there was no adequate explanation for the delay of one year and 10 months, and given the existence of the contracting out agreement the applicant had little chance of success. The argument for setting aside of the agreement due to "serious injustice" was untenable as the applicant's situation was a result of spending her own money during the course of the parties' relationship. The Judge declined to set aside the default choice of Option B and the extension of time and the setting aside applications fell by the way. With regards to provision from the willmaker's estate, the applicant claimed that the willmaker had made representations to her during her lifetime that he would always provide a home for her even after his death. This was not accepted by the Court given the evidence placed before it. However the Judge did consider the applicant should be granted the opportunity to argue that the willmaker had breached his moral duty to her. An extension of time to bring a claim under the FPA was granted. Judgment Date: 26 November 2020.