Relationship property division — relationship duration — unequal division — contribution to relationship — chattels — serious injustice — family home — occupation rent — Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 2A, 2C, 2D, 2E, 2G, 13, 14, 114A, 18, 18B & 21 — Ferguson v Fish 13/9/04, Judge Ryan, FC North Shore FAM-2003-044-1895 — Scragg v Scott [2006] NZFLR 1076 — Benseman v Foster (2006) 25 FRNZ 803 (HC) — McGregor v McGregor (No 2) (2002) 22 FRNZ 582, [2003] NZFLR 596 — Public Trust v Cornelius HC Hamilton CIV-419-1046 25 February 2009 Panckhurst J — G v B (2006) 26 FRNZ 28, [2006] NZFLR 1047 (HC) — Martin v Martin [1979] 1 NZLR 97 (CA) — Williams v Williams [2015] NZFC 3602 — GM v JL (2005) 24 FRNZ 385 — Lawson v Perkins (2007) 26 FRNZ 946 — Walker v Walker (2002) 22 FRNZ 452 — Schmidt v Jawad (2003) 23 FRNZ 101, [2003] NZFLR 1050 — LS v ZJ [2005] NZFLR 932 — S v W (2006) 25 FRNZ 49 — IAT v SJG [2013] NZHC 2976 — X v X [Economic disparity] [2010] NZLR 601 — Tarr v Tarr [2014] NZHC 1450 — Chong v Speller (2004) 24 FRNZ 273. The parties had been in two separate de-facto relationships, the second of which the applicant claimed was a relationship of over 3 years duration so qualifying for the presumption of equal sharing of relationship property under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA). The respondent disputed that the relationship was one of over 3 years. The Court had to determine whether the duration of the second de-facto relationship was over three years (s 2D of the Act), and if so, whether the court should exercise its discretion and deem the relationship to be one of "short duration" (s 2E(1)(b)(ii) PRA). If the relationship was deemed to be of short duration, the court then needed to consider whether there was a "child of the relationship" (s 14A(2)(a)(i) PRA), or whether the applicant had made a "substantial contribution" to the relationship (PRA, s 14A(2)(a)(i)) and if so, whether failing to make an order as to the relationship property under the Act would lead to serious injustice (PRA, s 14A(2)(b). Claims about the dates and nature of the relationship were disputed by the parties. The parties initially met when the applicant and one of her children began boarding in the respondent's home. They then entered into the first de-facto relationship, which lasted for 18 months, and re-connecting in late 2011 after which they began seeing each other on a semi-regular basis, later getting matching tattoos on their ring fingers as a sign of their commitment. In 2013 the respondent sold his original house and purchased a new house. The respondent stayed with the applicant prior to settlement, after which which they moved into together; beginning the second de-facto relationship. The respondent subsequently accepted employment working on the Christchurch rebuild and relocated alone. The respondent visited regularly until early 2015 and although the relationship was failing, continued visiting Auckland occasionally until mid 2016 staying at the house with the applicant and her child. The respondent claimed to do out of convenience. Both parties acknowledged the relationship was rocky with their issues finally coming to a head when the applicant was not invited to a family event in mid 2016. The Judge concluded that it was after this event when the parties no longer presented or communicated together as a couple, finding this to be the end of the parties' relationship. This meant the relationship had lasted just over 3 years but given the nature of the parties' relationship, the Judge deemed the relationship to be one of short duration. This meant an order could not be made under the PRA for the division of relationship property unless: there was a "child of the relationship"; or one party had made a substantial contribution; and whether failing to make an order would result in serious injustice. The Judge deemed the applicant's child who had lived with them to be a child of the relationship; difficulties in the child's behaviour and the resultant strained relationship with the respondent were not relevant for the purpose of the statutory exercise. The Judge found that the applicant had made substantial contributions to the relationship in the form of household duties, which enabled the respondent to travel for work and that not making an order would result in serious injustice. The Judge further found that the applicant had benefited significantly by living in the house rent-free since separation. Given the contributions made and the length and nature of the relationship it was determined that the property be split 80:20 in favour of the respondent. An order was made that the home is separate property of the respondent. Post-separation adjustments under s 18B of the PRA were made in regard to credit for maintenance of the property by the applicant and compensation to be made the respondent for occupation of the property. Additional orders were made in relation to other relationship property. Judgment Date: 28 May 2020. * * * Names have been changed to meet legal requirements. * * *