Strike out application — relationship property dispute — judicial settlement conference — consent orders — jurisdiction of Family Court — supervisory jurisdiction — creature of statute — inherent jurisdiction — ancillary powers — procedural powers — relitigation — abuse of process — functus officio — Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 1N, 21, 21J & 21F — Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 182 — Family Court Act 1980, s 11 — Family Court Rules 2002, rr 88, 175, 178, 179(3)(b), 193 & 198(2)(a) — Senior Courts Act 2016, s 12 — Re Coyne (2005) 24 FRNZ 922 — Attorney-General v Prince [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) — Couch v Attorney-General [2008] NZSC 45, [2008] 3 NZLR 752 — Kiwi Party Inc v Attorney-General [2020] NZCA 80, [2020] 2 NZLR 224 — MacPherson v McCafferty [1968] NZLR 489 (HC) — Joseph Lynch Land Co Ltd v Lynch [1995] 1 NZLR 37 (CA) — Quality Pizzas Ltd v Canterbury Hotel Employees Industrial Union [1983] NZLR 612 (CA) — New v New [2002] NZFLR 901 (HC) — Jones v Borrin [1989] 3 NZLR 227 (HC) — Phillips v Phillips [1993] 3 NZLR (CA) — DRM v AWH FC Queenstown FAM-2007-059-91, 1 February 2012 — MJT v DAW [2006] NZLFR 464 — Lau v Lau So [2012] NZFC 4159 — Aplin v Lagan (1993) 10 FRNZ 562 — Rush v Rush [1998] NZFLR 365, (1998) 16 FRNZ 536 — R v Smith [2003] 3 NZLR 617 (CA) — Siemer v Solicitor-General [2013] NZSC 68, [2013] 3 NZLR 441. This was an application to set aside a final order made by the Family Court in relation to the parties' relationship property dispute. The parties had participated in a judicial settlement conference and consented to final orders being made in final settlement of the dispute. The applicant subsequently sought to set aside the consent orders, and the respondent sought to strike out that application. In determining whether to strike out the application, the Court had to consider whether it had jurisdiction to set aside its own orders. The Family Court is a creature of statute without inherent jurisdiction, so a specific legislative provision of its powers must be identified in order for it to exercise them. The Family Court has ancillary "supervisory powers", but only in the sense of overseeing its own process to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur. It was a procedural power rather than a substantive power. Allowing a dissatisfied party to reopen the orders reached by agreement could amount to an abuse of process. The Judge concluded that there was no identifiable power for the Family Court to overturn its own final order. The application to set aside the orders was declined and the respondent's strike out application was granted. Judgment Date: 11 September 2020.